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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-INTENTIONAL
TORT EXCEPTION-The United States Supreme Court has held that
an assault and battery committed by an off-duty government em-
ployee is not barred by the intentional tort exception of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act where other government employees are negli-
gent in failing to prevent the assault and battery.
Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988).
On February 6, 1982, a naval medical aide named Carr finished
his shift at the Bethesda Naval Hospital and thereafter consumed
a large quantity of various alcoholic beverages.1 He packed a rifle
and some ammunition into a uniform bag and left his quarters.'
Later that evening, three naval corpsmen found Carr in an inebri-
ated condition lying face down on the floor of a hospital building.3
The corpsmen attempted to transport Carr to the emergency room
when he struggled and broke free, grabbing his bag and exposing
part of the rifle.' The corpsmen, startled at the sight of a rifle,
dissipated, neither taking further action to subdue Carr nor alert-
ing the appropriate authorities of Carr's dangerous propensities.'
Some time later, Carr fired several shots into an automobile being
driven near the Bethesda Naval Hospital by the Sheridans, causing
physical injury to Mrs. Sheridan and property damage to their
automobile.'
The Sheridans commenced an action in a federal district court7
against the United States Government under the Federal Torts
Claims Act (FTCA).8 They alleged that their injuries were the re-
1. Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 2452 (1988).
2. Id. Apparently Carr's roommate was aware that Carr possessed a firearm against
Navy regulations. Id. at 2455 n.5.
3. Id. at 2452.
4. Id. The rifle was a .22 caliber gun. Sheridan v. United States, 823 F.2d 820, 821 (4th
Cir. 1987).
5. 108 S. Ct. at 2452.
6. Id. The district court accepted the Sheridans' version of the facts as alleged in their
complaint and as supplemented by discovery. Id.
7. Id. at 2451. The district court record was not recorded.
8. Id. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982), provides in part:
[Slubject to the provisions of 128 U.S.C. sec. 2671-2680], the district courts ... shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful acts or omission of any employee of the government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
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sult of the government's negligence in allowing Carr to leave the
hospital with a loaded rifle." The district court dismissed the Sher-
idans' action, reasoning that their claim was barred by the inten-
tional tort exception to the FTCA1° and that "Fourth Circuit
precedents11 required dismissal because 'Carr happens to be a gov-
ernmental employee rather than a private citizen.' "12 The district
court rejected the Sheridans' argument that the intentional tort
exception was inapplicable because they were relying on the negli-
gence of the government employees who failed to prevent the as-
sault, and not on the fact that Carr was a government employee at
the time of the assault.1 s The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision.14 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 5
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
the Sheridans' claim was one "arising out of" an assault or battery
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place the act or omission occurred.
Id.
9. 108 S. Ct. at 2451.
10. Id. The exception to the FTCA, which provides the federal government with im-
munity for claims "arising out of" intentional torts, states in pertinent part: "[Tihe provi-
sions of [28 U.S.C. sec. 2671-2680] and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-(h)
any claim arising out of assault [or] battery . 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982) (emphasis
added).
11. See Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981). In Hughes, a federal
postal employee, while on his postal route, committed sexual assaults on two young girls he
had lured into his postal truck. Id. at 220. He had previously pled guilty to a related offense.
Id. The children's parents brought an action against the government under the FTCA,
claiming that the employee's supervisor was negligent in allowing the postman to remain in
a position where he came into contact with young children. Id. The district court held that
the claim was barred by § 2680(h) because the action arose from the sexual assault (inten-
tional tort) and not from the negligence of the supervisor. Id. The United States court of
appeals affirmed the district court's decision. Id.
See also Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986). In Thigpen, a naval
corpsman committed sexual assaults on two minor girls while they were hospitalized in a
naval hospital. Id. at 394. The children's representatives brought an action alleging that the
Navy was negligent in failing to supervise the Navy corpsman/assailant. Id. at 393. As in
Hughes, the district court in Thigpen barred the claim as one arising out of an intentional
tort and not from a lack of supervision by the government. Id. at 398.
12. 108 S. Ct. at 2452.
13. Id.
14. Id. See Sheridan v. United States, 823 F.2d 820 (4th Cir. 1987). Like the district
court, the court of appeals concluded that the Fourth Circuit's prior decisions in Hughes v.
United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981) and Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 383 (4th
Cir. 1986) were controlling. 108 S. Ct. at 2452.
15. 108 S. Ct. at 2453. The Court granted certiorari at 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988). The
Supreme Court found that a conflict existed among the circuits and "we therefore granted
certiorari to resolve this important conflict." 108 S. Ct. at 2453.
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within the meaning of the FTCA, where an off-duty government
employee committed an assault and battery, but other government
employees were negligent in failing to prevent the assault and bat-
tery. 6 The majority opinion, 7 written by Justice Stevens, held
that the Sheridans' claim was not barred by the intentional tort
exception to the FTCA.
1
8
Justice Stevens began his analysis by noting that the FTCA
gives federal district courts jurisdiction over claims against the fed-
eral government:
'[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred." 9
The Justice also recognized that this broad grant of jurisdiction
"shall not apply to. . . [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery °
or other specified intentional torts."2
The majority opinion conceded that the phrase "any claim aris-
ing out of" an assault or battery is undisputedly broad enough to
bar all claims based entirely on an assault or battery.2 The Court
explained, however, that the interpretation of these words becomes
confused when they are applied to a claim arising out of two tor-
tious acts, namely, an assault or battery flowing from the negligent
failure to prevent the same. 23 The majority nonetheless concluded
that in some situations the government cannot escape liability for
an injury directly caused by an assault and battery where the gov-
16. 108 S. Ct. at 2451.
17. Id. Justice Stevens' majority opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun. Id. Justice White filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2456. Justice Ken-
nedy also filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2456-58. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined. Id. at 2458-60.
18. Id. at 2456.
19. Id. at 2453 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982)). See supra note 8.
20. 108 S. Ct. at 2453 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)). See supra note 10.
21. 108 S. Ct. at 2453.
22. Id. at 2453-54.
23. Id. at 2454. The Court's exact language is as follows:
The words 'any claim arising out of' an assault or battery are unquestionably broad
enough to bar all claims based entirely on an assault or battery. The import of these
words is less clear, however, when they are applied to a claim arising out of two tor-
tious acts, one of which is an assault or battery and the other of which is a mere act
of negligence.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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ernment negligently allows the assault to occur.2 '
In reaching the instant decision, the majority relied to a great
extent on its previous decision in United States v. Muniz.25 The
Court held in Muniz that a prisoner who was assaulted by other
inmates could sue the United States to recover damages for inju-
ries caused by the negligence of prison officials who failed to pre-
vent the assault.
26
The Sheridan majority cited two theories in an effort to explain
why the claim in Muniz did not "arise out of" the assault that
caused Muniz's injuries. 27 First, the Court explained that because
Muniz alleged the negligence of the prison officials, the claim did
not arise solely out of the assault.28 The Court reasoned that under
this view, the intentional tortfeasor's conduct would not alone give
rise to government liability, but that the precedent negligence by
the government employees who failed to prevent the intentional
tort would, provided that the government, if a private person,
would be liable under the law of the place where the incident oc-
curred. 29 The Court noted that in response to this first theory, the
government in Sheridan argued that the "arising out of" language
must be broadly construed and that the Sheridans' negligence
24. Id.
25. 374 U.S. 150 (1963). The relevant facts of Muniz are as follows:
Respondent Muniz alleged that he was, in August 1959, a prisoner in a federal correc-
tional institution in Danbury, Connecticut. On the afternoon of August 24, Muniz was
outside one of the institution's dormitories when he was struck by an inmate, and
then pursued by 12 inmates into another dormitory. A prison guard, apparently
choosing to confine the altercation instead of interceding, locked the dormitory. The
12 inmates who had chased Muniz into the dormitory set upon him, beating him with
chairs and sticks until he was unconscious. Muniz sustained a fractured skull and
ultimately lost the vision of his right eye. He alleged that the prison officials were
negligent in failing to provide enough guards to prevent the assaults leading to his
injuries and in letting prisoners, some of whom were mentally abnormal, intermingle
without adequate supervision.
Id. at 152.
26. 108 S. Ct. at 2454.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Court stated:
First, it might be assumed that since he alleged an independent basis for tort liabil-
ity-namely, the negligence of the prison officials-the claim did not arise solely, or
even predominantly, out of the assault. Rather, the attention of the trier of fact is
focused on the Government's negligent act or omission; the intentional commission is
simply considered as part of the causal link leading to the injury.
Id.
29. Id. See Note, Torts-The Talismanic Language of Section 2680(h) of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 60 TzMP. L.Q. 43 (1987); and Note, Section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort
Claims Act: Government Liability for the Negligent Failure to Prevent an Assault and
Battery by a Federal Employee, 69 GEo. L.J. 803 (1981), urging this view.
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claim must be barred because without Carr's assault, there would
be no actionable claim.3
In reaching its decision in Sheridan, the Court declined to rely
on this first theory, stating that:
[E]ven accepting the Government's contention that when an intentional
tort is a sine qua non of recovery the action 'arises out of' that tort, we
conclude that the exception does not bar recovery in this case. We thus rely
exclusively on the second theory, which provides that the intentional tort
exception is simply inapplicable to torts that fall outside the scope of sec.
1346(b)'s general waiver.
3 1
The Court stated that this second explanation for the Muniz
holding is an adoption of Judge Harlan's reasoning in Panella v.
United States.2 In Panella, a prisoner brought a cause of action
against the United States under the FTCA claiming that an assault
by another inmate had been caused by the negligence of federal
employees.3 3 Judge Harlan, recognizing that the "immunity against
claims arising out of assault and battery can literally be read to
apply to assaults committed by persons other than government
employees,"3 4 concluded that section 2680(h) must be read against
the rest of the Act.3 Accordingly, Justice Stevens further reasoned
that "[t]he exception should therefore be construed to apply only
to claims that would otherwise be authorized by the basic waiver of
sovereign immunity."3 Justice Stevens reasoned that because an
assault committed by a non-employee of the government could not
provide the basis for an actionable claim under the FTCA, the in-
30. 108 S. Ct. at 2454. The Court did not feel the need to resolve the dispute created
by their first theory and the government's responding argument. The Court instead relied
exclusively on their second theory. Id. See infra text.
31. 108 S. Ct. at 2454.
32. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). The relevant facts are as follows:
Arnold Panella was convicted under a Kentucky statute in a Kentucky State Court as
a habitual drug addict. He was sentenced to 12 months in jail, but placed on proba-
tion upon his election to undergo treatment for his addiction at the Public Health
Service Hospital in Lexington, Ky., maintained and controlled by the United States
through the Army Surgeon General. While an inmate at that institution he was alleg-
edly assaulted by another inmate. He has sued the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. secs. 1346, 2674, and 2680, to recover damages for his
injuries, claiming that the assault was caused by the negligence of employees of the
United States in failing to provide adequate guards and otherwise properly supervise
those confined in the institution.
d. at 623.
33. Id.
34. 108 S. Ct. at 2454 (citing Panella, 216 F.2d at 624).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2454-55.
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tentional tort exception likewise could not apply to the assault.3 7
He further opined that the exception only applies, and retains im-
munity for the United States, in cases arising out of assaults com-
mitted by federal employees.3a
Applying Judge Harlan's analysis39 in Panella to the Sheridan
case, Justice Stevens stated that:
If nothing more was involved here than the conduct of Carr at the time he
shot at petitioners, there would be no basis for imposing liability on the
Government. The tortious conduct of an off- duty serviceman, not acting
within the scope of his office or employment, does not in itself give rise to
Government liability whether that conduct is intentional or merely
negligent.
As alleged in this case, however, the negligence of other Government em-
ployees who allowed a foreseeable assault and battery to occur may furnish
a basis for Government liability that is entirely independent of Carr's em-
ployment status. 40
Relying on the assumption made by the district court and the
court of appeals that the Sheridans' version of the facts would sup-
port recovery under Maryland law on a negligence theory if the
naval hospital had been owned and operated by a private person,
the Court stated:
It seems perfectly clear that the mere fact that Carr happened to be an off-
duty Federal employee should not provide a basis for protecting the Gov-
ernment from liability that would attach if Carr had been an unemployed
civilian patient or visitor in the hospital. Indeed, in a case in which the
employment status of the assailant has nothing to do with the basis for im-
37. Id. at 2455. This is the Court's reasoning for their conclusion that the intentional
tort exception is inapplicable to torts that fall outside the scope of the FTCA's general
waiver of the government's immunity from liability.
38. Id.
39. Id. Judge Harlan emphasized the statutory language that was critical to his analy-
sis in describing the coverage of the FTCA. He explained that the FTCA authorizes actions
for personal injuries "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment. . . (italics
supplied)." Id. (citing Panella, 216 F.2d at 623). The Sheridan Court stated: "We need only
move the emphasis to the next phrase-'while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment'-to apply his [Harlan's] analysis to the assault and battery committed by the off-
duty, inebriated enlisted man in this case." Id.
40. Id. The Court further stated that:
By voluntarily adopting regulations that prohibit the possession of firearms on the
naval base and that require all personnel to report the presence of any such firearm,
and by further voluntarily undertaking to provide care to a person who was visibly
drunk and visibly armed, the Government assumed responsibility to 'perform [its]
good Samaritan task in a careful manner.' Indiana Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61, 65, 76 S. Ct. 122, 124, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955).
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posing liability on the Government, it would seem perverse to exonerate the
Government because of the happenstance that Carr was on a Federal
payroll."'
The Court also stated that the characterization of Carr's conduct
as intentional rather than negligent was irrelevant. 42 The majority
concluded its opinion by stating that "because neither Carr's em-
ployment status4" nor his state of mind has any bearing on the ba-
sis for petitioners' claim for money damages, the intentional tort
exception to the FTCA is not applicable in this case." '44 The judg-
ment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case was
remanded.4"
Justice White, in a short concurring opinion, 6 indicated that his
views previously expressed in United States v. Shearer7 are in-
consistent with his present understanding of the application of the
FTCA.'8 Justice White indicated that he and three other Justices49
were of the view that section 2680(h) bars recovery where an as-
sault by a government employee results from the negligent act of
another employee. 0 He indicated, however, that the court in
41. Id. The Court noted that the government may be responsible for an assault even
though the identity of the assailant is unknown. The Court cited as an example Doe v.
United States, 838 F.2d 220 (1988), which held that an action could be brought under the
FTCA even though discovery failed to identify the assailant as a government employee. 108
S. Ct. at 2455 n.7.
42. 108 S. Ct. at 2456. The Court further reasoned that:
If the Government has a duty to prevent a foreseeably dangerous individual from
wandering about unattended, it would be odd to assume that Congress intended a
breach of that duty to give rise to liability when the dangerous human instrument
was merely negligent but not when he or she was malicious. In fact, the human char-
acteristics of the dangerous instrument are also beside the point. For the theory of
liability in this case is analogous to cases in which a person assumes control of a
vicious criminal, or perhaps an explosive device. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
Id.
43. The Court noted that "[b]ecause Carr's employment status is irrelevant to the
outcome, it is not appropriate in this case to consider whether negligent hiring, negligent
supervision, or negligent training may ever provide the basis for liability under the FTCA
for a foreseeable assault or battery by a Government employee." Id. at n.8.
44. Id. at 2456.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 473 U.S. 52 (1985). In Shearer, a plurality of the court held that § 2680(h) barred
a claim caused by a government employee's assault which allegedly resulted from the negli-
gence of another employee. Id. at 52.
48. 108 S. Ct. at 2456.
49. Id. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor shared this view
with Justice White. 473 U.S. at 53.
50. 108 S. Ct. at 2456.
1989
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Shearer did not address the issue of whether or not it makes a
difference as to whether the assailant is acting within the scope of
his employment." Justice White concluded his concurrence by
stating that "to the extent the views I shared there [in Shearer]
are inconsistent with my present understanding, I think the
Court's opinion, which I join, has the better of it."5
Justice Kennedy contended in his concurring opinion5 3 that the
majority's adoption of Judge Harlan's reasoning in Panella was
misdirected. 5' He reasoned that the Sheridans' claim was that the
government was negligent, independent from the intentional tort
committed by Carr.5 Therefore, Justice Kennedy argued, the issue
to be resolved was how to give effect to the FTCA's authorization
of negligence suits without disemboweling the Act's exception of
claims "arising out of" intentional torts."
Justice Kennedy criticized the Court for its failure to clarify the
meaning of "independent" negligence and for its failure "to ex-
plain how the legal significance of antecedent negligence somehow
changes with the employment status of the intentional
tortfeasor. ' '57 The Justice also criticized the Court for its avoidance
of whether a negligent hiring or negligent supervision claim may
51. Id.
52. Id. The Court stated in Shearer that: "[R]espondent cannot avoid the reach of sec.
2680(h) by framing her complaint in terms of negligent failure to prevent the assault and
battery. Section 2680(h) does not merely bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping lan-
guage it excludes any claim arising out of assault or battery." 473 U.S. at 55.
53. 108 S. Ct. at 2456-58. Justice Kennedy stated that: "I write separately to set forth
the bases for my differences with those opinions (the majority and dissenting opinions), and
for my conclusion that the Court correctly decides that the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals must be reversed." Id. at 2456..
54. Id. at 2457. Justice Kennedy stated that:
In an adaptation of Judge Harlan's analysis in Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622
(CA2 1954), the Court asks whether the tortfeasor's actions occurred 'while acting
within the scope of his office or employment.' Ante, at 2455. Since 'the tortious con-
duct of an off-duty serviceman, not acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, does not in itself give rise to Government liability whether that conduct is
intentional or merely negligent,' the Court concludes that the intentional tort excep-




56. Id. Justice Kennedy stated that the determination of whether or not the assailant
was acting within the scope of his employment will not necessarily resolve this issue. Id. The
Justice further stated that "[tihe proper inquiry must depend on an analysis of the Govern-





ever provide the basis for liability under the FTCA. 5
Although agreeing that the dissenting opinion59 was correct to
focus on the statutory language of the FTCA, Justice Kennedy
contended that "[t]he dissent's fundamental premise seems to be
that any injury in which an intentional act is a substantial cause
necessarily arises only from that intentional act. This contradicts
the basic rule that the same injury can arise from more than one
wrongful act. .. -60 Justice Kennedy expressed his agreement
with the opinion of Chief Judge Winter, who authored the dissent-
ing opinion of the Sheridan case when it was before the court of
appeals. 1 Adopting Judge Winter's reasoning, Justice Kennedy
opined that:
[T]o determine whether a claim arises from an intentional assault or battery
and is therefore barred by the exception, a Court must ascertain whether
the alleged negligence was the breach of a duty to select or supervise the
employee-tortfeasor or the breach of some separate duty independent from
the employment relation.. . . If the allegation is that the Government was
negligent in the supervision or selection of the employee and that the inten-
tional tort occurred as a result, the intentional tort exception of sec. 2680(h)
bars the claim."
Otherwise, Justice Kennedy stated, to allow such claims would
frustrate the purpose of section 2680(h). s
58. Id. Justice Kennedy stated:
Although its opinion asserts that it avoids the question of whether a negligent super-
vision claim may be pressed against the Government in such a case, Ante, at 2456,
that issue is unavoidable, both as an analytic matter and on the facts of this case. As
I explain more fully below, our inquiry should address whether a finding of liability
for negligent supervision would undermine substantially the intentional tort
exception.
Id. See supra note 43.
59. 108 S. Ct. at 2458-60.
60. Id. at 2457. In support of his contention, Justice Kennedy cited the following
passage:
Where voluntary acts of responsible human beings intervene between defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's injury, the problem of foreseeability is the same and courts
generally are guided by the same test. If the likelihood of the intervening act was one
of the hazards that made defendant's conduct negligent-that is, if it was sufficiently
foreseeable to have this effect-then defendant will generally be liable for the conse-
quences . . . so far as scope of duty . . . is concerned, it should make no difference
whether the intervening actor is negligent or intentional or criminal. 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, LAW OF TORTS. sec. 20.5, pp. 1143 1145 (1956).
Id.
61. Id. at 2458.
62. Id.
63. Id. Justice Kennedy opined that "litigants could avoid the substance of the excep-
tion because it is likely that many, if not all, intentional torts of Government employees
plausibly could be ascribed to the negligence of the tortfeasor's supervisors." Id. Justice
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Lastly, Justice Kennedy asserted in his concurrence that the
government's negligent performance of its Good Samaritan duty
under the law of Maryland would create government liability if
Carr had been a private person. " The Justice contended further
that on this theory, the government's negligence is independent of
and does not depend on the employment status of the intentional
tortfeasor 5
In sum, Justice Kennedy stated that where the plaintiff's claim
is based on the employment relation between the intentional
tortfeasor and the government, such as a negligent hiring or super-
vision claim, section 2680(h) applies and the United States enjoys
immunity.6 However, where the plaintiff's claim is based on the
independent negligence of the government, section 2680(h) is inap-
plicable and the government is stripped of its immunity.6 '
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, dissented from the holding in Sheridan.8 The dissent ar-
gued in favor of a much broader construction of section 2680(h)
which would encompass all injuries associated in any way with an
assault or battery. 9 The dissenters rejected the majority's inter-
Kennedy further argued that:
The Court is wrong to imply that this issue is somehow removed from the facts of
this case. It is squarely implicated here, and the trial court should be advised how to
deal with it, not left to wonder. It is quite plausible to argue that Carr was mis-
supervised by Government officers who had authority over him and had, we may as-
sume, the duty to control his unauthorized behavior and enforce the Government
regulations restricting the possession of firearms on the naval base. Absent the excep-
tion set forth in sec. 2680(h), the Government could be held negligent for failing to
supervise Carr in a way such that the rifle would be discovered.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Justice Kennedy clearly stated that "[t]he intentional tort exception does not
preclude recovery under a theory of independent governmental negligence, despite the pres-
ence of a (barred) negligent supervision claim." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. See supra note 59.
69. 108 S. Ct. at 2459. The dissent explained that:
If we were to construe the words according to their ordinary meaning, we would say
that a claim 'arises out of' a battery in any case in which the battery is essential to
the claim. Thus when the Court construed another exception to the FTCA for claims
'arising in respect of. . .the detention of any goods' by customs or law enforcement
officials, 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680(c), we equated 'arising in respect of' with 'arising out of'
and decided that the phrase includes 'all injuries associated in any way with the de-
tention of goods.' See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854, 104 S. Ct. 1519,
1523-1524, 79 L.Ed.2d 860 (1984). A parallel construction of the exception at issue
here leads to the conclusion that it encompasses all injuries associated in any way
with an assault or battery. Indeed, four Justices described the exception essentially in
838
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pretation of Muniz70 and further opined that the legislative history
of section 2680(h) does not support the narrow limitation adopted
by the majority."1 Justice O'Connor also indicated that intentional
torts are often times held to be superseding causes which act to
absolve a negligent party from liability.72 Lastly, the dissent ex-
pressed hope that the Court would at least preserve "the core of
the assault and battery exception" by applying the exception to
claims of negligent supervision of a government employee who
commits an assault or battery while acting within the scope of his
employment.
73
Because the Sheridan decision was based on the construction of
the intentional tort exception to the FTCA, a brief recital of the
statute's history and its pertinent provisions will place the Court's
decision in perspective. At English common law, the notion of
''sovereign immunity" developed based on the idea that "the King
could do no wrong."'7 Early American courts applied the English
common law rule7 which meant that the United States could not
be sued without its consent.7 In 1946, Congress enacted the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, where for the first time, the federal govern-
ment subjected itself to liability for the "negligent or wrongful acts
this way in United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38
(1985).
Id.
70. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that: "The Court's decision in this case extends its
erroneous interpretation of Muniz. . . . Because I reject the interpretation of Muniz on
which the majority's argument is premised, I reject this extension as well." Id. at 2459-60.
71. Id. at 2460. The dissent pointed out that when Congress enacted the exception,
"Mr. Holtzoff, a Special Assistant to the Attorney General, told the Senate in general terms
that the torts of assault and battery were excluded from the FTCA." Id. (citing Tort Claims
Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 39 (1940)). At the Hearings, Mr. Holtzoff
explained that:
[Tihe theory of these exemptions is that since this bill is a radical innovation, per-
haps we had better take it step by step and exempt certain torts and certain actions
which might give rise to tort claims that would be difficult to defend, or in respect to
which it would be unjust to make the Government liable.
108 S. Ct. at 2460 (citing Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H.R. 7236
before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.,
22 (1940)).
72. 108 S. Ct. at 2460.
73. Id.
74. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 131 at
1033 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
75. See Cohen v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821); Kawananakoa v.
Polybank, 205 U.S. 249 (1907).
76. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 74, at 1033.
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or omissions" of its employees.7" At the same time, however, Con-
gress retained the sovereign immunity of the United States for
claims arising out of certain enumerated intentional torts by enact-
ing section 2680(h).78 Thus, the federal government is liable for
clearly negligent acts and is not liable for clearly intentional ones.
However, where an injury results from both negligent and inten-
tional conduct, the result has been less clear.
Courts have been quite willing to bar a claim against the federal
government, via section 2680(h), where a plaintiff's injury is solely
caused by the conduct of a federal employee that can only be cate-
gorized as intentional.7  Additionally, courts have habitually al-
lowed actions by plaintiffs who have alleged that government negli-
gence led to an assault and battery by a third person not employed
by the government.80 The courts have been in conflict, however,
77. Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401-22, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-78, 2680 (1982)). See supra note 8 for the
pertinent language of the FTCA.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). See supra note 10 for the relevant language of §
2680(h).
79. See Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921
(1976). In Lambertson, a federal employee jumped on the plaintiff's back riding him piggy
back. Id. at 442. The court held that the federal employee's conduct constituted a battery
within § 2680(h), and that plaintiff's claim could not be maintained under the FTCA predi-
cated on negligence. Id. at 443-44.
In Lewis v. United States, 194 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1952), the court held that a civilian could
not recover from the government as a result of being struck by a bullet when a guard fired
at the tire of civilian's car to prevent his escape. Id. at 689-90. The court reasoned that
because use of the gun constituted excessive force, the plaintiff's injury was due to assault.
Id. at 694-95.
In Stepp v. United States, 207 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1953), a civilian seaman was shot by an
army guard for failure to halt when so directed. Id. The court held that the plaintiff's action
was barred by § 2680(h) because the shooting was clearly intentional. Id. See also Wine v.
United States, 705 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983). In Wine, an action was brought under the
FTCA against the United States by a plaintiff who was sexually assaulted and shot by an
off-duty Air Force sergeant. Id. In affirming the district court's dismissal, the court of ap-
peals stated that the plaintiff's claim was barred by § 2680(h) "where the claim arises out of
assault, battery or various other enumerated torts." Id.
In Doe v. United States, 769 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1985), an Air Force clinical social worker
sexually assaulted a military dependent. Id. The court barred the plaintiff's action, holding
that the social worker's assault fell within § 2680(h) as clearly intentional. Id. See also
Hughes v. United States, 662 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1981). See supra note 11.
80. See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). See also Brown v. United States,
486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973) (where a prisoner claims that the negligence of the federal
government led to an attack by fellow inmates, the substance of the claim is negligence);
Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1968) ( section 2680(h) inapplicable to claim
against the government for failing to provide protection); Fleishour v. United States, 244 F.
Supp. 762 (N.D. Ill. 1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987
(1967) (court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) did not bar a federal prisoner's negligence action
where prison officials placed approximately 40 prisoners in a single dormitory room, with no
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where the government's negligence leads to an assault and battery
by a governmental employee.
Most courts, relying on dictum in Panella v. United States,8'
have concluded that section 2680(h) bars a negligence claim
against the government for failing to prevent a federal employee's
assault and battery upon a plaintiff.12 In Panella, a patient in a
federal mental hospital stabbed a fellow patient. 3 The injured pa-
tient brought an action against the United States under the FTCA,
claiming that the assault and battery was caused by the negligence
of government employees in failing to provide sufficient guards and
proper supervision of the other patients. 4 The district court dis-
missed the claim, holding that it "involved a claim arising out of
assault.""' The Second Circuit reversed, ruling that the intentional
tort exception to the FTCA does not bar a claim when government
negligence allows for an intentional tort by someone other than a
guard present, resulting in prisoner's assault by a fellow inmate); Cohen v. United States,
252 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 389 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1967)
(court held that § 2680(h) was inapplicable where plaintiff was beaten by a fellow prisoner
and alleged negligence of prison officials in allowing a dangerous prisoner to escape from
maximum confinement).
81. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). See supra note 32.
82. See Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 885
(1980) (court held that § 2680(h) bars a claim against the government for negligently failing
to prevent violent behavior of off-duty soldiers); Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 286
(2d Cir. 1962) (court stated in dictum that § 2680(h) bars a negligence claim against the
government when a federal employee commits an intentional tort); Collins v. United States,
259 F. Supp. 363, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (court held that a cause of action grounded in the
government's negligent hiring and based on a government employee's assault and battery is
barred by § 2680(h)); Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 923 (E.D. Va. 1972) (court held
that § 2680(h) bars a claim that the government negligently failed to prevent intentional
torts by airport policeman); Moffit v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 34, 38 (E.D. Tenn. 1976)
(court adopted the employee/nonemployee approach set forth in Panella, but held that §
2680(h) does not bar a negligence claim where a mail carrier, in attacking plaintiff, lacked
the requisite mental state to commit the intentional tort); Pennington v. United States, 406
F. Supp. 850, 851 (E.D.N.Y. 976) (court held that § 2680(h) bars a negligence claim against
the government for inadequate training or negligent supervision of an off-duty government
employee who assaulted plaintiff); Gale v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 574, 578 (D.S.C.
1980) (court adopted the employee/nonemployee approach, but held that § 2680(h) was not
a bar to a negligence claim when a Marine acted outside the scope of duty by assaulting
plaintiff); Johnson v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1966) (court held that §
2680(h) would have been applicable if the assault on the federal prisoner had been inflicted
by a government employee instead of by another prisoner).
83. 216 F.2d at 623.
84. Id.
85. Id. A final judgment, dismissing the complaint upon motion of the United States
for summary judgment under rule FED. R. Civ. P. 56 was entered in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York. Id.
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government employee.8 6 In dictum, the court suggested that sec-
tion 2680(h) would bar a negligence claim where a plaintiff at-
tempts to hold the government liable on a negligence theory for
assaults committed by government employees.8 7 Thus, under the
reasoning set forth in Panella, if an assault and battery results
from government negligence, the application of section 2680(h) de-
pends on whether the assailant is an employee of the
government.8
The employee/nonemployee approach adopted in Panehla has
been followed by a majority of courts. 9 In Naisbitt v. United
States,90 for example, two off-duty airmen raped, killed, and as-
saulted a number of civilians.91 The victims' representatives
brought suit 92 against the United States under the FTCA, alleging
the negligence of the government in failing to supervise and curtail
the two airmen.93 The plaintiffs argued that the airmen's conduct
was reasonably foreseeable and, therefore, the Air Force supervi-
sors had a duty to restrain the airmen. 4 The plaintiffs further ar-
gued that the failure of the Air Force supervisors to fulfill this
duty resulted in an actionable negligence claim under the FTCA9
The district court dismissed the action "on the ground that the
claim actually arose from assault and battery and was therefore
barred by 28 U.S.C. sec. 2680(h). ... " The United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion29 However, the court recognized that when the government
86. Id. at 624.
87. Id. at 624-25.
88. See supra note 29 (citing law review articles advocating this view).
89. See Naisbitt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1350, 1353 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Pen-
nington v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); and Collins v. United States,
259 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
90. 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1980).
91. Id. at 1351.
92. There were five different law suits which were consolidated for trial and appeal. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court stated that "the theory of plaintiffs' case is that the United States
was guilty of actionable negligence in failing to supervise and curtail the two airmen in
question in that it was reasonably foreseeable that they would, unless restrained, perpetrate
serious injuries." Id.
96. Id. at 1352. In justifying its judgment of dismissal based on the principle that a
distinction is to be drawn between assault committed by government employees and as-
saults which are committed by non-government employees, the district court cited Pen-
nington v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Panella v. United States, 216
F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954); and Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962), afJ'd, 374
U.S. 150 (1963). See also Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1972).
97. 611 F.2d at 1356.
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has a duty to prevent a nonemployee from committing an assault
and fails to fulfill that duty, section 2680(h) does not bar a negli-
gence claim based on the resulting injury.9 8
A minority of courts do not follow the employee/nonemployee
rationale in applying section 2680(h), but instead give emphasis to
the legal causation issue.9 For example, in the decision of Under-
wood v. United States,100 the Fifth Circuit focused on the plain-
tiffs' negligence claim, rather than on the intentional tort.'0 ' In
Underwood, an action was brought against the United States aris-
ing out of an airman's killing of his former wife.'0 2 The decedent's
father and personal representative claimed that the United States
negligently released the assailant from a psychiatric clinic back to
active duty, which gave him access to weapons. 0 3 The United
States denied that it owed any duty or that it breached any duty
that may have existed.' °0 The district court held for the United
States, 105 but the United States court of appeals reversed, reason-
98. Id.
99. See United States v. Shively, 354 F.2d 294, 296-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965) (court said that government's negligence in issuing a gun was not the cause
of injury where plaintiff sued under FTCA alleging the negligence of United States in al-
lowing her husband, a serviceman, to have access to weapons in violation of regulations and
despite knowledge of his past mental condition). See also Underwood v. United States, 356
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966), discussed infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text; and Fair v.
United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956), discussed infra notes 108-114 and accompany-
ing text.
100. 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 94. The father and personal representative claimed that the United States
was negligent in the following respects:
(1) By allowing Edward F. Dunn, an airman in the United States Air Force stationed
at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, who was in an emotionally and mentally dis-
turbed state of being, which condition was known to the agents of the United States
at Maxwell Air Force Base, to obtain a .45 caliber automatic pistol that was used by
Airman Dunn to kill Shirley Underwood; and (2) By allowing Edward F. Dunn,
known by the agents of the United States to be in an emotionally and mentally dis-
turbed state, to return to duty, the performance of which gave him access to a dan-
gerous instrumentality, to-wit, a .45 caliber automatic pistol.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. The district court ruled there was no negligence on the part of the medical
officers in releasing Dunn to active duty and no causal connection between his release and
the subsequent killing. Id. The court further stated that:
[Allthough Airman Dunn did not follow the standard Air Force procedure for draw-
ing his weapon, no liability can be predicated on the theory that he obtained a
weapon belonging to the United States for the reason that it was not reasonably fore-
seeable that he would use this weapon, or any weapon, as a means of killing Shirley
Underwood Dunn.
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ing that the government's negligent release of the assailant to ac-
tive duty, which gave him access to weapons, proximately caused
the decedent's death.106 Therefore, the court held that section
2680(h) did not apply.
10 7
Another Fifth Circuit decision, Fair v. United States,108 ex-
amined a claim of negligently caused assault and battery. 109 In
Fair, an Air Force officer shot and killed a student nurse, two
guards, and then himself.110 The complaint alleged that the officer
had previously threatened the life of the nurse and that Air Force
medical officers knew of the threats and had promised to notify the
nurse before releasing the officer.' The government moved to dis-
miss,1 12 and the district court granted the motion. "' The Fifth Cir-
cuit reversed and remanded, holding that the complaint properly
alleged government negligence, thereby entitling the plaintiffs to a
trial." "
The Third Circuit has also relied primarily on the duty/causa-
tion approach. In Gibson v. United States,11 5 the plaintiff brought
an action against the United States under the FTCA to recover for
injuries inflicted by a Job Corps trainee."' The complaint alleged
that the government was negligent in failing to "take reasonable
Id.
106. Id. at 99. The court stated:
Under the circumstances of the present case, we are left in no doubt that negligently
releasing Dunn to duty which gave him access to weapons, and negligently permitting
Dunn to draw the .45 caliber pistol and ammunition with which he shot and killed his
former wife were proximately connected with Mrs. Dunn's death.
Id.
107. Id.
108. 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 290.
111. Id.
112. Id. The government moved to dismiss, arguing "that the exclusionary provisions
of the Federal Tort Claims Act defeated the court's jurisdiction, and that the complaint
stated no claim upon which relief could be granted." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 296. The court stated: "(W]e hold that the complaint is sufficient under the
authorities discussed to entitle plaintiffs to a trial on the facts." Id.
115. 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972).
116. Id. at 1392-93. Gibson was employed by the Federal Electric Co. to train Job
Corps enrollees at the Ranitan Arsenal in Edison, New Jersey. Id. Jessie, a juvenile delin-
quent with a known history of narcotics abuse, was a Job Corps trainee employed by the
United States. Id. at 1393. The United States was aware of Jessie's drug abuse. Id. On
November 5, 1966, Jessie drove a screwdriver through Gibson's temple while Gibson was
engaged in the performance of his duties as a Job Corps instructor. Jessie was engaged in
his employment with the United States and was under the influence of narcotics at the time
of the assault. Id.
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measures for appellant's safety, thereby causing him to suffer inju-
ries. .. "7 The district court dismissed the action for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the claim fell within sec-
tion 2680(h). " ' The court of appeals held that section 2680(h) did
not bar the negligence claim for two reasons.11 9 First, the court de-
termined that the assailant's attack was a foreseeable consequence
of the government's failure to exercise due care and, therefore, did
not supercede the government's negligence. 2 0 Second, the court
stated that it did not think that Congress intended the exception
to apply to the facts in Gibson.''
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Bennett v. United States, 2' de-
termined that where government negligence is the proximate cause
of the injury, section 2680(h) does not shield the government from
liability. 2 3 In Bennett, the parent plaintiffs brought an action
under the FTCA against the United States on behalf of their sexu-
ally abused children. 2 " The district court held for the government,
but the court of appeals reversed, holding that section 2680(h)
does not absolve the United States from liability for a teacher's
sexual assaults of students.' 5 The court reasoned that the govern-
ment was negligent in hiring the teacher,'26 and rejected the analy-
sis of government liability based upon the distinction between gov-
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1392. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss pursu-
ant to § 2680(h) "as a claim arising out of assault and battery." Id. at 1393.
119. Id. at 1395.
120. Id. The court further stated that "the injury arose out of the basic negligence of
the United States and the attack was the foreseeable consequence of the original miscon-
duct." Id.
121. Id.
122. 803 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1502-03. The facts of the case are as follows: Terry Lee Hester applied for a
teaching position at a boarding school for the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id. He represented
on his application for employment that he had been previously arrested and charged with
violating Public Decency statutes. Id. at 1503. The government made no investigation and
employed Hester as a teacher. Id. Hester subsequently kidnapped, assaulted and raped sev-
eral students enrolled at the boarding school while he was off-duty. Id.
125. Id. at 1502.
126. Id. In reaching its decision, the court relied to a great extent on a previous Ninth
Circuit decision, Jablonski ex rel. Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th cir. 1983). In
Jablonski, the Ninth Circuit held that where the government's negligence consisted in fail-
ing to exercise due care in dealing with a mental patient known by responsible government
agents to be homicidal, § 2680(h) does not shield the government from liability. Id. at _.
The court reasoned that because the government had notice and could have prevented the
crime by the exercise of due care, the government was liable for its own negligence. Id.
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ernment employees and nonemployees."2' Thus, under the
reasoning set forth in Bennett, an analysis of government liability
requires an examination of the negligence which led to the assault
and battery, rather than the employment status of the intentional
tortfeasor. 25
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Sheridan, adopted
Judge Harlan's reasoning in Panella v. United States."29 The ma-
jority arrived at a rather complicated holding that the intentional
tort exception to the FTCA is inapplicable to torts that fall outside
the scope of section 1346(b)'s general waiver of governmental im-
munity. 3 ' The Court reasoned that section 2680(h) should be con-
strued to bar only those claims that would otherwise be authorized
by section 1346(h)."3 Justice Stevens further explained that be-
cause an assault committed by a nonemployee would not authorize
a claim under the FTCA, the exception could not apply to bar such
an assault; more correctly, the Court stated, the exception is only
applicable to claims arising out of assaults committed by federal
employees.' 2 Therefore, under Justice Stevens' reasoning, when
determining whether the intentional tort exception applies to bar a
particular claim, it must first be determined whether the claim is
authorized under section 1346(b)."3 '
Justice White's concurring opinion'3 ' suggested a change of posi-
tion as to his previously held view, in United States v. Shearer,'35
that section 2680(h) bars recovery for damage caused by an assault
committed by a government employee resulting from the negli-
127. 803 F.2d at 1504. The Bennett court stated that "the only distinction between
the government's alleged negligence in this case and Jablonski is that Hester was on the
government payroll and Jablonski's negligence was a proximate cause of the injury in both
cases . . . [W]e note that this result is consistent with that reached in other jurisdictions."
Id. (citing Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
473 U.S. 52 (1985); Underwood v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Mass. 1980)). The
Bennett court added that "even some cases compelled to deny liability by their circuit's
precedent concede that the distinction between governmental employees and non-employees
is irrational." Id. at 1504 (citing Wine v. United States, 705 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1983)).
128. See supra note 41. See also Doe v. United States, 838 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1988);
Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984) (court held that § 2680(h) did not
bar plaintiff's claim for negligent supervision which led to assault and battery).
129. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954). See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
130. Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449, 2454 (1988). See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
131. 108 S. Ct. at 2454-55. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
132. 108 S. Ct. at 2455.
133. Id. at 2454-55.
134. Id. at 2456.
135. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
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gence of other government employees."3 6 However, United States
v. Shearer involved a claim where the theory of government negli-
gence was predicated on negligent supervision. 37 Therefore, Jus-
tice White's views expressed in the Sheridan case are not necessa-
rily inconsistent with those expressed in Shearer because "the
intentional tort exception does not preclude recovery under a the-
ory of independent governmental negligence, despite the presence
of a (barred) negligent supervision claim."' 38
Although Justice Stevens' majority opinion reaches a correct
conclusion, its analysis is misplaced. The Court is wrong to focus,
as Justice Kenendy's concurrence suggests, 139 on whether the
tortfeasor's actions occurred "while acting within the scope of his
office or employment." 10 Instead, the Court should have concen-
trated on an analysis of the government's antecedent negligence.1'
Under this analysis, the focal point is the theory on which the gov-
ernment's negligence is predicated 42 (i.e., is the theory of negli-
gence based upon negligent hiring or supervision, or upon the inde-
pendent negligence of the government?). As Justice Kennedy
pointed out in his concurrence, the majority apparently would al-
low a claim against the government if it is based on the negligence
"of other government employees . . . that is entirely independent
of [the intentional tortfeasor's] employment status.""13 However,
the Court fails to explain "the meaning of 'independent' negligence
or to explain how the legal significance of antecedent negligence
somehow changes with the employment status of the intentional
tortfeasor.""'
1 4
The majority also fails to address the issue of whether a negli-
gent supervision or hiring claim may ever be authorized under the
FTCA. 1 5 Justice Kennedy's concurrence and Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion correctly argue, however, that where a claim
arises out of government negligence and a subsequent intentional
136. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
137. 108 S. Ct. at 2459.
138. Id. at 2458.
139. Id. at 2456-57. See supra notes 54 and accompanying text.
140. 108 S. Ct. at 2457.
141. This is the view advocated by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion. He
stated: "The proper inquiry must depend on an analysis of the Government's acts or omis-
sions and of the theory on which the Government's negligence is predicated." Id. See supra
note 56.
142. 108 S. Ct. at 2458.
143. Id. at 2457.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2456 n.8. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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tort, section 2680(h) applies to bar the claim if the theory of gov-
ernment negligence is that the government was negligent in the su-
pervision or selection of the employee.""6 To allow such claims
would erode the core of the exception.
Justice O'Connor, dissenting' from the holding in the Sheridan
case, would apply the intentional tort exception to bar any claim
"associated in any way with an assault or battery,"148 regardless of
the existence of any negligence on the part of the government.""
Such a broad construction of the exception is unwarranted and
unjustified.
The dissent argues that "intentional torts sometimes are found
to be superceding causes that relieve a negligent party of liabil-
ity. 1 50 In support of this contention, the dissent cites section 448
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 5' However, section 448
makes clear that a third person's commission of an intentional tort
is not a superceding cause where the intentional act is reasonably
foreseeable. 52 Therefore, the clear language of section 448 would
operate to impose liability on the government in Sheridan (be-
cause Carr's assault and battery was reasonably foreseeable), and
not, as the dissent suggests, absolve the government of
responsibility.
In conclusion, where a claim arises out of an intentional tort,
and the negligence that precedes it, courts should focus on an anal-
ysis of the theory on which the government's antecedent negligence
is predicated when determining whether the intentional tort excep-
tion to the FTCA applies to bar a particular claim. Where the the-
ory of government negligence is an allegation of negligent supervi-
sion or selection of the employee, section 2680(h) should be
146. See 108 S. Ct. at 2458 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also 108 S. Ct. at 2460
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2458-60.
148. Id. at 2459.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2460.
151. Id.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965). Section 448 states:
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superceding
cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct
created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such
a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or
should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that
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applied to bar the claim. However, where government negligence is
independent of the employment relationship between the inten-
tional tortfeasor and the government, section 2680(h) should not
be applied to bar the claim and the government should be respon-
sible for its negligence.
Gregg Guthrie

